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By the turn of the twentieth century, the Qing court sought to incorporate and homogenise its 
imperial periphery. This shift towards firmer control of its Mongolian borderlands with 
neighbouring Russia elicited anti-imperial sentiments among the indigenous population. 
Complexities arose when the Russian government sought to utilise native separationist 
movements for the promotion of its own political ends: more precisely, to create a loyal 
autochthonous buffer at the poorly defended border. The article examines resistance by the 
nomadic borderlanders against the sovereignty claims of the state, arguing that the rejection of 
the state provoked a surge of both local and national identity formation along the border. It 
analyses nomads’ reactions to the Manchu court’s imperial policies, Russian exploitation of 
indigenous dissatisfaction, and the question of whether the native borderlanders, in the early 
twentieth century, gained independence or were subjugated by different means. 
 





With Russia’s annexation of the Amur and Ussuri territories in the 1850s, the Qing court no 
longer perceived its northern imperial periphery as a remote territory but as an object of 
development.1 China’s Manchu rulers subsequently shifted from ban to encouragement of 
Han-Chinese colonisation to Mongolia. Small groups of Chinese farmers, usually originating 
from famine-stricken regions south of the Great Wall, had long transgressed into the fringes 
of the Mongolian steppes and grasslands. Migration accelerated, particularly in Inner 
Mongolia, so that by the late nineteenth century Chinese peasants far outnumbered the 
natives. Another element of the Qing court’s reaction towards Russia’s expansionism was a 
policy change in the 1900s that entailed the extension of its ‘New Policies’ (新政) up to the 
outermost regions with the ultimate goal of transforming the relatively autonomous 
Mongolian bannerlands into regular Chinese provinces.2 As a result, the nomads began to 
resist the Han immigration and state reforms of the Chinese. As the imperial periphery came 
under pressure from both Beijing and St Petersburg, it became a buffer between two empires 
with strained relations, and so ceased to be a backwater at the imperial margins.  
 
What follows is a discussion of several lenses onto this development: nomads’ reactions to 
Beijing’s policies, Russian exploitation of indigenous dissatisfaction, and the question of 
whether the borderlanders, in the early twentieth century, gained independence or were 
subjugated by different means. This article takes a micro-level approach by portraying one 
native individual in his struggle for independence and by focusing geographically on one 
region: Hulunbeir – today’s northeastern tip of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region in 
China. While previous scholarship has acknowledged that Russia’s active role in the 
Mongolian independence movement of the 1910s was a proxy means of pursuing its own 
imperial agenda (Tang 1959: 293–358; Paine 1996: 272–313), it is still unclear to what extent 
the Russian state, along similar lines, exploited the dissatisfaction of the indigenous people 
prior to the downfall of the Qing regime. I will argue here that, long before Mongols in 
Khalkha and Hulunbeir declared independence from Beijing, St Petersburg pursued an active 
role in supporting the secessionist movement of the indigenous population living at the 
margins of the Russian and the Chinese empires. The Mongols were well aware that Russia’s 
policy was by no means altruistic, but a reflection of vested imperial interests. Faced with the 
choice between a great evil and a lesser one, however, they opted for Russian support. As 
soon as St Petersburg had achieved the objective of reducing China’s influence in the 
borderlands, it no longer supported the native insurgents. 
 
 
AN IMPERIAL PUPPET ON STANDBY: THE CAREER OF THE	INSURGENT 
TOKHTOGO 
 
Insurrections by nomads were not a new phenomenon in Mongolia, but had occurred 
constantly since the mid nineteenth century. However, with the implementation of the ‘New 
Policies’ and the official opening of Inner Mongolian pasture lands for cultivation in 1902, 
the scale changed. Now massive revolts against aggressive Chinese colonisation took place in 
most of the Inner Mongolian leagues (Lan 1996: 74–7). The obstruction of land surveys, for 
instance, or the plunder of Chinese local governments, the murder of officials, and other 
forms of violent opposition fielded by the Mongolian rebels generally provoked military 
campaigns in response (Lan 1999: 49–50). 
 
With this new wave of active opposition to Beijing’s reforms, the still easily penetrable Sino-
Russian state border began to play a crucial role. Those who challenged the reforms openly 
could seek assistance from across the border or take refuge in the neighbouring country. Some 
Mongolian partisan biographies manage to convey a broad picture of the advantage of de 
facto uncontrolled state borders, the anger against Han colonisation, the ‘New Policies’ 
reforms, and Russia’s collaboration in the struggle for independence. Self-testimonies of 
nomads, however, hardly ever appear in imperial archives, as few of the partisans were able to 
write, and their scant written testimonies were hardly ever recorded in the archival files. 
Tokhtogo,3 interrogated in the summer of 1910 by the Governor of Transbaikalia, was one of 
the resisters against Han rule. He spoke Chinese and Mongolian, but was illiterate. His 
translator, however, wrote down his life story as a unique account. Perhaps as a result, his 
biography reads like a glorification of an uncivilised hero from the steppe. 
 
Tokhtogo was born in 1862 as hereditary son of the prince (taiji) of the south wing of Gorlos 
banner, far away from Hulunbeir and the border to Russia. That banner formed part of Jirim 
league (哲里木盟, also referred to as Jirem) in Jilin province, one of the regions transgressed 
by the newly built Chinese Eastern Railroad.4 Han immigration in this banner had begun 
before the official opening and taxation of bannerland in 1902.5 Tokhtogo was appalled by the 
Han colonisation of the Jirim league, the ubiquity of unscrupulous behaviour towards the 
Mongols on the part of the Chinese, the lack of protection against random robbery, and the 
absence of initiative among the Mongol nobility to resolve these problems. 
 
Tokhtogo resorted to open resistance when Han-Chinese troops advanced northwards into 
Jirim in 1900. Under the camouflage provided by the Boxer Uprising,6 the Han invaders 
grabbed land, seized Mongol livestock and abducted women and girls. In response, Tokhtogo 
took up weapons. With support from a group of 10 native elders whose families had all 
suffered from the invasion and massacre, he met the invaders in battle. None of the aggressors 
returned alive.  
 
Tokhtogo’s career as a rebel during the following decade reads almost like a fairy tale. 
Leading groups of 10 to 60 armed men, never larger, he resisted imperial advance. He fought 
Chinese soldiers and farmers, captured Chinese colonisation officials and destroyed their 
bureaus. In order to survive, his militia robbed Chinese traders and distributed some of the 
loot to the poor. In 1907, with the prince’s approval, Tokhtogo murdered a group of five 
Japanese topographers. They had been surveying territories in his native Southern Gorlos 
banner to ready them for colonisation by Chinese government. Afterwards the Japanese 
government joined Chinese authorities in chasing the Mongol rebel. To avoid being captured, 
he went underground; three of his sons and some of his partisan fellows joined him. The 
murder of the Japanese earned Tokhtogo fame and wide support among the indigenous 
people. On occasion, he would suddenly surface at different places in Khalkha, Hulunbeir, the 
Greater Xingan range and in the Nenjiang river valley, as if the banner lands were still ‘empty 
space’. The Chinese genuinely feared the insurgent and his rebel force, who were said to have 
claimed more than 1200 killed or wounded between 1907 and 1910 – most of them Chinese 
soldiers (Tokhtogo 1910: 215–17 – see historical supplement, this volume; RGVIA, Voennyi 
Gubernator Zabaikal’skoi oblasti 6.6.1911; LOC, Lattimore (undated): 7–8).7 
 
Naturally, the Russian government followed the developments across the border, and the 
Minister of War and other key political leaders sensed Tokhtogo’s potential role in the inter-
imperial struggle for control. In the spring of 1909, the head of the Transamur Border Guards8 
surmised that Tokhtogo might be useful for Russian espionage, nomadic partisan organisation 
and subversive political action in Hulunbeir against the Chinese government: 
 
Tokhtogo’s popularity among the Mongols and Solons […] determines the 
political significance of having him at our disposal. In case of any 
complications in the Far East Tokhtogo can be of special value to us and may 
be used as a means […] to extend our influence in the region north and south of 
the railroad from Manzhouli up to Zhalantun Station. (GAChO, Nachal’nik 
Zaamurskogo okruga otdel’nogo korpusa pogranichnoi strazhi 23.3.1909) 
 
As early as 1908, Russian authorities in Harbin, the administrative centre of Russian 
Manchuria, had proposed granting asylum in Transbaikalia to Tokhtogo and his supporters. 
After lengthy debates among the Ministries of War and of Foreign Affairs, and almost two 
years of secret negotiations with Tokhtogo, the partisan agreed, accepting the precondition 
that Russia would grant him asylum only if he crossed the border without any open help. In 
the spring of 1910, Russian officials meticulously prepared the flight. His middleman 
received explicit instructions and documents from the Russian General Consul in Harbin, as 
Russian officials knew that China would try to hamper the escape. They identified a suitable 
place in Khalkha where the Mongol group could pass the border without notice (GAChO, 
Voennyi Gubernator Zabaikal’skoi oblasti 14.1.1910). In order to deceive Tokhtogo’s 
Chinese persecutors, the Russian border commissioner of Kiakhta spread rumours among 
local Mongols that Tokhtogo was in hiding in a remote area of Mongolia, far from the 
Russian border (GAChO, Kiakhtinskii Pogranichnyi Komissar 31.3.1910). 
 
In spite of these efforts, the conspiracy failed. In April 1910, about 80 Chinese soldiers from 
an Urga battalion attacked Tokhtogo and his comrades in Tsetsenkhan aimak of Khalkha 
region the night before they crossed the border. Tokhtogo’s men killed 31 Chinese during the 
fight and took six hostages, executing them after interrogation. According to his own account, 
Tokhtogo lost just two men in action, one of them his son. In the end, Tokhtogo entered 
Russian territory with 47 male Mongolian comrades, weapons, and more than 200 horses. Yet 
the plan to hide the secret hideaway of the Mongolian rebel had failed (Tokhtogo 1910: 216 – 
see historical supplement, this volume; ‘Uchenie Tokhtokho-Taizhi’ / ‘The teachings of 
chieftain Tokhtogo’, Zabaikal’skaia nov’ [Transbaikal News] 12.6.1910 (25.6.1910): 3–4). 
 
A heated correspondence between Chinese and Russian diplomats and provincial authorities 
followed the coup. The Chinese imperial resident of Hulunbeir demanded that the Russians 
detain and deport the Mongolian insurrectionist (GAChO, Hulunbeir Amban 1910). But the 
Russian Military Governor of Transbaikalia refused to hold diplomatic negotiations with the 
Chinese imperial resident of Hulunbeir. Instead, he reiterated the position of the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which classified the Mongol not as an ordinary criminal fugitive 
(who would have to be extradited) but rather as a political refugee (GAChO, Voennyi 
Gubernator Zabaikal’skoi oblasti 17.7.1910; RGIA, Upravliaiushchii Ministerstvom 
Inostrannykh Del 16.4.1910). In early June 1910, rumours circulated that in pursuing 
Tokhtogo about 1000 Chinese soldiers had passed Lake Dalai and approached Khalkha. In 
addition, about 800 banner troops of Tsetsenkhan aimak were said to have been mobilised, 
supported by 100 Chinese soldiers from Urga for protection in the event of Tokhtogo’s return 
(‘V poiskakh Tokhtokho’ / ‘In search of Tokhtogo’, Zabaikal’skaia nov’, 3.6.1910 
(16.6.1910): 3). At the same time, the Chinese were said to have sent spies to Transbaikalia to 
neutralise his escape to Russian territory. The Russian border commissioner of Kiakhta 
claimed to know the whereabouts of at least two Chinese spies who were in search of 
Tokhtogo. He described these ‘tourists’ to the Military Governor of Transbaikalia as people 
‘dressed in ragged Mongol garments; that is the usual Chinese way of espionage disguise in 
poverty, feigning an idiot’ (GAChO, Kiakhtinskii Pogranichnyi Komissar 23.6.1910). 
 
But in Russia, Tokhtogo and his men were relatively safe at last. After the flight, the everyday 
lives of the rebels underwent significant change. One of Tokhtogo’s companions told a 
journalist writing for the Chita newspaper Zabaikal’skaia nov’ in 1910: 
 
For several years, we have attacked the Chinese in revenge for what they had 
done to us by plundering us and abducting our wives and children. We have 
never touched a single Mongol. The Chinese authorities have more than once 
attempted to detain us, and several times we were even surrounded by them, 
but we were able to escape and harm them. […] We are accustomed to the 
harsh life. Our main chieftain Tokhtogo [Tokhtokho-taizha], […] speaks to us 
every day and suggests behaving modestly and living at peace with the 
population, not offending or insulting anyone. In other words, he makes us 
forget our previous military life. We endorse his teachings and wholly 
subscribe to them. (‘Uchenie Tokhtokho-Taizhi’ / ‘The teachings of chieftain 
Tokhtogo’, Zabaikal’skaia nov’ 12.6.1910 (29.6.1910): 3–4) 
 
Thus, even before Khalha and Hulunbeir had declared independence, the Russian press 
celebrated the noble savage.  
 
Despite the value of Tokhtogo and his refugees to the Russian government, the slow mills of 
Russian bureaucracy delayed aid to them. For more than a year, the men camped in yurts on a 
temporarily assigned spot in Western Transbaikalia, far away from Hulunbeir. Economic 
circumstances forced them to sell 50 of their 200 horses, undermining Tokhtogo’s authority 
among his subordinates. Only in July 1911 were Tokhtogo and his followers naturalised as 
Russians and given an allowance of 13,500 rubles. They were further assigned about 1635 
hectares of land in the Aga Steppe, near the Hulunbeir border, where eventually they were 
assimilated into the indigenous Buriat Cossacks roaming the territory (GAChO, Voennyi 
Gubernator Zabaikal’skoi oblasti 5.12.1910 and RGVIA, Voennyi Gubernator Zabaikal’skoi 
oblasti 6.6.1911: 47; RGVIA, Voiskovoi shtab Zabaikal’skogo Kazach’ego voiska 7.6.1911; 
RGVIA, Ustroistvo July 1911). In the Aga Steppe, the pacified rebel became, almost, an 
ordinary herder again, a fighter only in waiting.  
 
The rebel for an independent Mongol state had been courted and supported by the Russian 
authorities early on. In retrospect, his attempt to fight against Han-Chinese colonisation and 
the Qing ‘New Policies’ provided significant impetus for the indigenous population of 
Hulunbeir and its neighbouring territories to do the same. Therefore, Tokhtogo’s story is 
emblematic of two themes: it showcases the resistance of the peripheral indigenous 
population to Chinese imperial policies; and at the same time, it reveals how the Russian 
empire attempted to spur on this insurgency in order to gain indirect control over Chinese 
borderland areas such as Hulunbeir. In sum, St Petersburg granted asylum to a negligible 
rebel, not out of altruism but from clear self-interest. As far as the indigenous insurgent was 
concerned, however, with respect to conflicting notions of territory and border, his allegiance 
was still to the ethnic community rather than the Russian empire. Tokhtogo thus embodies the 
type of ‘detachable men’ that were were caught between two competing empires both 
regarding him as their subject. ‘Detachable people’ could fall victim to conflicting 
allegiances, one of which in Tokhtogo’s case was his dependence on Russia as external power 
while the other was the link to his own group of followers.9 
 
 
WHEN THE SUBALTERN SPEAKS UP: THE 1911 REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLT 
IN HULUNBEIR 
 
In the latter half of 1911, more than a year after Tokhtogo and his men had escaped to Russia, 
the state of affairs in China proper gave the Mongols a new opportunity to revolt. The Xinhai 
Revolution broke out under the banner of a rising Han nationalism. It meant, indeed, the end 
of Manchu rule, but viewed from China’s ethnic periphery it was also a unique opportunity 
for secession from the Heavenly Kingdom altogether.10 On the heels of the collapse of the 
Qing Dynasty, Outer Mongolia declared independence on 1 December 1911. The leading 
nobles declared Jebtsundamba Khutukhtu to be Holy Khan (Bogd Khan) of Mongolia. 
Bearing in mind the example of Inner Mongolia, Khalkhans knew exactly what Chinese 
colonial policy entailed: they had seen the Chinese Republic fall prey to the ‘New Policies’ 
and rally behind the Han colonisation sponsored by the late Qing government. By separating 
from China proper, they hoped to avoid their kinsmen’s fate in Inner Mongolia (Lan 1996: 
78–95).11  
 
Following the example of Outer Mongolia, the indigenous elites of Hulunbeir declared the 
region independent in January 1912, and called for unification with the newly created 
Khalkha empire. In addition, in some banners in Inner Mongolia where Chinese oppression 
had become intolerable, people rebelled and sought independence. Urga supported their cause 
and launched a general military campaign. Tokhtogo, however, who in the meantime had left 
his Russian refuge and hastened to Urga to take charge of the Holy Khan Jebtsundamba 
Khutukhtu’s bodyguards, was not allowed to participate (LOC, Lattimore (undated): 8; Lan 
1996: 234). Though revolt also broke out in Inner Mongolian bannerlands, these territories 
were already too closely interwoven with the Chinese provinces to furnish the secular or 
ecclesiastical leaders who would be able to unify the indigenous people for a common 
political cause. In the end, Chinese Republican forces succeeded in suppressing the 
secessionist tendencies in those banners.12 
 
Through an extensive network of informants, the Russian authorities stayed well informed 
about major developments in this rebellion. The first general assembly of influential 
Hulunbeir tribal leaders was held in September 1911 – weeks before the Wuchang Uprising 
erupted on 10 October. The banner leaders protested against their disempowerment and 
requested the Chinese authorities to remove Chinese officials, to reintroduce autonomous 
regional administration, to pull out all Chinese troops, and to stop Han colonisation. During a 
second congress in November 1911, it was decided, in obedience to orders from Urga, to 
proceed with the formation of troops for the purpose of fomenting open rebellion. The first 
day of the revolt was scheduled for 2 (15) December 1911 (Baranov 1912: 55–6; Men’shikov 
1917: 37–8; Woodhead 1914: 622; RGIA, Shtab 1912: 62-62 obl.; Meshcherskii 1920: 5–6). 
 
The Chinese authorities refused to accommodate the September demands of the Barguts.13 
The Mongols distrusted Sun Yat-sen and other Chinese revolutionaries, and instead focussed 
their hopes on Russia. Rumours circulated among the Mongols, indicting Chinese 
revolutionaries for slaughtering Mongols, and suggesting that protection could be expected 
only from foreigners. Some Mongols in Hulunbeir even tried to adopt Russian citizenship. 
Corrupt Chinese authorities further fuelled anxieties among the local Mongol population. In 
Hailar, it was reported that the Head of Chinese administration had jailed many who were 
innocent of any crime, and that at night Chinese soldiers searched for Mongols to rob and 
beat. According to a secret Russian report, ‘arrests and prosecutions were carried out for the 
personal gain of the chief of prefecture, as he is willing to release arrested Hulunbeir Mongols 
for money’. More diplomatically, the Chinese administrator of Hulunbeir (daotai)14 tried to 
win the sympathies of the Mongol senior officials with a banquet. He hoped that they could, 
in turn, influence the population (RGIA, Shtab 1911: quotation 48 obl.). 
The hopes of the Chinese administrator were in vain, however. The rebels had 
removed the Chinese sentry posts on the border to Russia, one by one, without significant 
opposition from the border guards. More and more armed banner men gathered in the vicinity 
of Hailar; by the Russian New Year, their numbers had swelled to more than 500. On 2 (15) 
January 1912, they encircled the Chinese administration and the barracks of the Chinese 
troops. The insurgents demanded the departure of all Chinese administrative officials and 
soldiers from the territory of Hulunbeir. On the night before the attack, the Chinese 
administrator and his administration had taken refuge in the Russian-controlled railroad 
concession. Chinese soldiers made their way to the Russian concession within the city and 
agreed to a proposal by the Russian consulate to surrender their weapons. Thus, in the 
morning, without a single shot being fired, Hailar came under control of the Mongols. Public 
order remained perfectly intact: there were no reports filed about looting or violence against 
the remaining Chinese. Chinese traders opened their shops as they did every day. The non-
violent takeover did not last for long, however. One week after assuming control, the new 
regime presided over a number of searches in residences throughout the city. The new masters 
discovered uniforms, weapons, ammunition, and 196 young Chinese men in civilian dress 
hiding in private houses. The men were arrested, handed over to the Russian authorities and 
deported the same day on trains towards Harbin. Thus did the Russians support the Mongols 
in their quest to cleanse the region of Chinese forces (RGIA, Shtab 7.1.1912 and 11.1.1912; 
‘Mongoly v Khailare’ / ‘Mongols in Hailar’, Dumy Zabaikal’ia [Transbaikal Thoughts], 
12.1.1912 (25.1.1912): 2). 
 
Negotiations were still ongoing between Chinese officials sent from Heilongjiang’s provincial 
capital, Qiqihar, and the rebels on the matter of Hulunbeir’s future status when several 
hundred Mongolian soldiers began marching westward, approaching the Russian-controlled 
railroad town of Manzhouli on the border. Since it was almost entirely inhabited by Russians 
and Chinese and was located inside the Russian-controlled belt of alienation (polosa 
otchuzhdeniia),15 the Mongols cared little about who controlled it. Their prime concern was 
with the Chinese military detachment stationed at the nearby garrison of Lubinfu, about 2 km 
south of Manzhouli. Officially, only about 150 Chinese soldiers were stationed at Lubinfu, 
but in the wake of the rebellion the garrison had been fortified. Commander Zhang, its head, 
averred that he expected to engage in battle with the Mongols. Though confident he would 
win, he was also a realist, willing to withdraw his soldiers in case of defeat; he expected the 
rebellion to be brief and regular Chinese military to reach the region soon.16 
 
But these security measures proved ineffective, and Zhang’s assurance misguided. On 20 
January (2 February) 1912, Mongols captured and looted the Chinese garrison. They 
dismantled the buildings, sold the plunder and set parts of the town on fire. According to 
Russian intelligence, Erwin Baron von Seckendorff, a German reserve officer in charge of the 
Chinese Customs House at Manzhouli, agitated among the Chinese in a successful bid to 
persuade them to resist the Mongols rather than surrender Lubinfu (RGIA, Shtab 19.1.1912; 
‘Mongoly u st. Man’chzhuriia i v Khailare’ / ‘Mongols near Manzhouli Station and in Hailar’, 
Dumy Zabaikal’ia 29.1.1912 (11.2.1912): 2). American sources confirm that the German 
baron had directed the fire of Chinese troops against the Mongol attack. After their defeat, the 
Chinese soldiers and authority officials were made to march to the railroad station, and then 
transported to Qiqihar. The customs commissioner Baron von Seckendorff, in turn, remained 
in charge of the Customs House at Manzhouli (NARA, Maynard 8.2.1912: 69). 
 
 
OPAQUE ENTANGLEMENTS: RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE REVOLT 
 
Weeks before the Chinese defeat at Lubinfu, the Russian government was well aware of the 
looming insurrection. It reacted swiftly. As early as late 1911, St Petersburg increased its 
troop presence east of Lake Baikal. Two divisions were deployed at various railroad stations 
in Transbaikalia to protect Russian interests in North Manchuria and to regain full control 
over the Chinese Eastern Railroad line. About 3000 railroad carriages were being held in 
reserve at Manzhouli, fitted to accommodate 40 soldiers each, so as to transport up to 120,000 
men at very short notice (NARA, Maynard 24.11.1911: 40 and 19.12.1911: 47). 
 
Whereas the occupation of Hailar had been carried out without direct Russian military 
assistance,17 Chinese and Russians held different views about the extent of Russian support to 
the Mongols in Manzhouli two weeks later. Several possible motives drove Russian action in 
Manzhouli: the wish to maintain a buffer between thinly populated borderlands in Siberia and 
the increasing Han-populated areas, to forestall a strong Chinese military presence in Outer 
Mongolia and Hulunbeir and to preserve a homogenous indigenous region free of significant 
foreign elements in Mongolia, enabling Russia to reap the benefits of economic development 
without competition. According to instructions from St Petersburg, Russia would remain 
strictly neutral in the event of hostilities between the Chinese and Hulunbeir banner people 
(Tang 1959: 83). Yet there are good reasons to believe that the Russian government or some 
Russian military leaders did, in fact, openly intervene on the side of the Hulunbeir Mongols.  
 
Though Hulunbeir was far removed from the seedbeds of revolution and of secondary 
concern to international observers, several foreigners were witness to these events. Doctor 
P.M. Jee was one of them. The San Francisco-born Chinese was employed by the Chinese 
Government as medical officer in charge of the Imperial Chinese Hospital at Manzhouli. Jee 
feared the Mongols looked upon him as a Chinese official and not as a US citizen. He 
requested that the American Consul, Lester Maynard, in Harbin protect him and his family, 
all of whom resided in Manzhouli’s Russian railroad concession (NARA, Jee 7.2.1912: 240; 
NARA, Maynard 9.2.1912: 19). Jee was in charge of the Red Cross Hospital Service and so 
became an eyewitness of the Manzhouli clashes. He wrote to the American Consul: 
 
[n]o one here can fail to see that the Russians are using the Mongols as tools to 
gain their object. The latter admitted in the beginning that they could not fight 
the Chinese and did not care for Manzhouli. Many of the Russians claim that 
their government is not responsible for what is going on here, but that a certain 
[Martynov], the General Commander in Harbin, has brought all the last two 
weeks’ happenings. (NARA, Jee 12.2.1912: 263) 
 
The American doctor sent a long list of further evidence to the US Consul, painting a scene in 
which Mongols followed Russian instructions, firing from Russian-controlled railroad 
territory, waiting there in reserve, and finally returning weapons to the Russians after the 
fighting. Jee also claimed that at least 20 scouts from the 15th Siberian regiment assisted in 
the fighting (NARA, Jee 12.2.1912: 1–3). The US Consul supported this version of events, in 
which Lieutenant General Evgenii Martynov acted independently, and contrary to the 
instructions from St Petersburg or at least without its consent, in favour of assisting the 
Mongols (NARA, Maynard 7.2.1912: 68; 8.2.1912: 69; 15.2.1912: 71).  
 
Martynov took a different view of the hostilities. During the two years he had served as head 
of the guards of the Chinese Eastern Railroad (i.e. the Transamur Border Guards), he became 
a proponent for Russian annexation of Manchuria as soon as political conditions would allow 
it. Later, Martynov would make the case for such a coup in a thin, self-published brochure. To 
him the Mongolian independence movement was an ideal opportunity for the Russians to 
move ‘the Russian border, as a strategic marker, to the [Greater] Xingan mountains’ 
(Martynov 1914: quotation: 82). According to Martynov’s own account, he ordered all 
Russian officers to remain neutral but combat-ready, which led – he proclaimed – to the ‘great 
result’ that the well-armed Chinese troops in Hailar and Manzhouli were defeated by the 
Mongol fighters without offering much resistance, so that there were only two Mongol 
casualties. Kaplinskii, a Russian officer from the 15th Siberian sniper regiment, also fell, ‘as 
he wished to observe the fight from a short distance, and by his own initiative […] dressed in 
a Mongol uniform and was killed while he mingled with the Mongols’ (Martynov 1914: 80–
93, quotation: 81–2). 
 
Yet another picture was painted by the Russian press. According to an eyewitness 
correspondent of the newspaper Man’chzhurskaia gazeta (Manchurian Newspaper), some 
Mongol fighters accidentally entered Russian railroad territory during the fighting. To von 
Seckendorff, the commander of the Chinese regiment, this mistake offered a welcome 
opportunity to lodge a protest against Russian interference. During the battle a few Mongols 
were taken prisoner by the Chinese. Von Seckendorff’s adversary Kaplinskii and a few of his 
fellow soldiers accidentally found themselves in the line of fire between Mongols and 
Chinese (‘St. Man’chzhuriia’ / ‘Manzhouli Station’, Man’chzhurskaia gazeta, 11.2.1912 
(24.2.1912): 3). Another witness, a reporter for Dumy Zabaikal’ia, saw Kaplinskii’s role quite 
differently. In his view, the latter was to deliver a message from the Russian authorities to the 
Chinese garrison with a warning not to expand military operations into the Chinese Eastern 
Railroad zone of alienation. According to his account, Kaplinskii was shot as he mounted his 
horse, holding a white flag in his hand (‘Mongoly u st. Man’chzhuriia i v Khailare’ / 
‘Mongols near Manzhouli Station and in Hailar’, Dumy Zabaikal’ia, 29.1.1912 (11.2.1912): 
2). 
 
In contrast to the Russian accounts, however, it was of minor consequence to Chinese 
officials whether a high-ranking Russian officer had acted independently or was acting on 
orders from the capital. To them the immediate outcome was, necessarily, the same. The 
newly appointed acting military and diplomatic Chinese administrator of of Hulunbeir, Jing, 
who succeeded the expelled administrator Huang Shifu (黃仕福), had arrived for negotiations 
with the Mongols at the Chinese garrison of Lubinfu early on the morning of 2 February 
1912. However, the Mongols refused to recognise his authority, and the scheduled 
negotiations did not take place. The Chinese administrator of Hulunbeir also became an 
eyewitness to the unfolding events, ultimately endorsing Dr Jee’s version. According to his 
testimony, Russians started attacking the Chinese garrison from the north and Mongols from 
the east at six o’clock in the morning. Twenty Mongolian soldiers and one Russian officer 
died. Thus ‘the Russians, in assisting the Mongolians, have openly violated their neutrality’ 
(NARA, Hailar daotai 1912: 235). Although the Chinese were able to hold the garrison at 
first, it fell two days later, after a superior force of Mongol soldiers had arrived from Hailar.18  
 
While the various accounts of the strike against the Lubinfu garrison near Manzhouli, of 
Chinese, Russian, US-American and German provenance, vary in detail, they do agree that 
Russian assistance seems to have played a decisive role in the secession of Hulunbeir from 
China. This interference was certainly in line with Russian interest at the time: the ousting of 
Chinese troops from its state border and its Manchurian railroad concession enabled Russia to 
secure the imperial periphery and exploit the economic benefits to be extracted from northeast 
China at lower risk and cost.  
 
Weeks of uncertainty followed the expulsion of Chinese civil and military corps. Suspicious 
of the peace, the Mongols remained on guard and stationed 250 soldiers in the Lubinfu 
garrison. Above Manzhouli’s Chinese Maritime Customs office waved the flag of the 
Republic of China; on the roof of the residence of the Chinese delegate, however, the Imperial 
Dragon still flapped (‘Zhizn pos. Man’chzhuriia’ / ‘Life in Manzhouli’, Dumy Zabaikal’ia, 
23.2.1912 (7.3.1912): 2). After the hostilities in Hailar and Manzhouli, the Mongols delivered 
their claims in a letter to the Hulunbeir administrator: 
 
We are determined not to recognise the Republic and not to submit to the 
oppression of the Chinese officials. We respectfully advise both of you 
gentlemen to promptly prepare and depart with your subordinate officials for 
your homes, and enjoy peace. All other people engaged in trade and other 
occupations will be left absolutely unmolested; on the contrary, they will be 
extended special protection. […] If you oppose us by opening fire, we will be 
obliged to fight. Our righteous army of Hulunbeir respects the principles of 
humanity, and will not murder the Chinese. (NARA, Mongols 1912: 250) 
 
However, despite such promises, anti-Chinese violence erupted in Hulunbeir shortly after the 
capture of Hailar. Conditions became alarming, and Chinese officials warned the population 
that, if they supported the Mongols, their property would be confiscated as soon as the city 
was retaken by Republican forces. False rumours of Chinese reinforcements marching 
towards Hailar fuelled the already-tense atmosphere (NARA, Maynard 25.1.1912: 62). On 8 
(21) April 1912, Mongolian soldiers, mostly Solons, looted Chinese shops and eateries in Old 
Hailar and arrested hundreds of Chinese. ‘According to recent rumours’, the Dumy 
Zabaikal’ia correspondent informed his readers, ‘the Mongols expelled all the Chinese out of 
the old city, driving them off to the belt of alienation, leaving only the merchants untouched’ 
(‘Mongoly v Khailare’ / ‘Mongols in Hailar’, Dumy Zabaikal’ia, 3.4.1912 (16.4.1912): 2). 
The US consul in Harbin reported that  
 
[…] the principal buildings being entirely destroyed by fire, and the Chinese 
population, being subjected to great suffering and sustaining heavy losses […] 
were in a panic, and tried to escape from the town, yet 600 Chinese were 
captured by the Mongols who apparently intended to hold them for ransom. 
The authorities were helpless, and looting continued. The only things being 
saved were articles that the owners managed to take to the Russian part of the 
town. 
 
Observers debated whether the total anarchy had been prompted by political or patriotic 
reasons, or whether a mutiny sparked by Mongolian soldiers who had not been paid set off the 
riots. In any case, the morning after the riots, Russian authorities pressured the Mongolian 
administration to restore order (NARA, Maynard 13.4.1912: 90).  
 
Thus, while Russia had been reluctant to get involved too closely in Inner Mongolia for fear 
of Japanese reaction, the tsarist empire was willing to become involved in Hulunbeir.19 
Backed by the Russian military, the Mongols had succeeded in taking control of the 
borderland. At first glance, the imperial borderland had been restored to independence. For 
the nomads still roaming the region, however, the future was less certain than ever. 
 
 
DEPENDENT INDEPENDENCE: HULUNBEIR FROM 1912 TO 1915 
 
After the Mongols declared independence and expelled Chinese officials and military, the 
status of Hulunbeir became a hotly debated issue among Russian politicians and 
commentators.20 In a speech to the Duma on 26 April 1912, three months after Hulunbeir 
became independent, Sergei Sazonov, Russian Foreign Minister, declared himself opposed to 
land annexation on Russia’s periphery because it did not pose significant military risk to the 
empire: 
 
I cannot perceive any reasons why the annexation of Northern Mongolia 
[Khalkha and Hulunbeir – author] should be useful to us. Our interests require 
only that, as Mongolia lies on our frontier, no strong military power should be 
established there. Owing to the proximity of the Mongols, our Siberian frontier 
is better guarded than if we were to construct fortresses with large garrisons. 
(NARA, Sazonov 1912: 8) 
 
Sazonov pointed to the differences between Inner and Outer Mongolia and cautioned that 
attempts to unite them were hardly likely to be a political success. He was even sceptical 
about an independent national existence for Outer Mongolia. The Minister saw Russia’s role 
as that of an intermediary between China and Mongolia, stressing that Russia must strive to 
have a seat at any negotiation table brokering an agreement between the two. He named three 
principal conditions to guide future relations between China and Outer Mongolia. First, he 
asserted, no Chinese administration was to be introduced; second, no Chinese troops were to 
be deployed in the region; and, third, Chinese colonists must be denied access to the region 
(NARA, Sazonov 1912: 1–10). 
 
The Russian Foreign Minister agreed that the restoration of Chinese sovereignty in Hulunbeir 
would be acceptable, as long as Russian economic interests were respected and Hulunbeir 
remained self-administered by locals (Tang 1959: 84–6). It did not suit Russian interests to 
unite Hulunbeir with Outer Mongolia. The two treaty ports of Manzhouli and Hailar were 
subjected to scrupulous surveillance by the international community, foreclosing the 
possibility of a complete annexation of the area.21 At the same time, the guarded Russian 
railroad concession in the area secured Russian claims sufficiently, and when in the future 
China was to assert its ‘interest in the railway, this would have confirmed Chinese 
connections with Outer Mongolia just when Russia was anxious to emphasize the lack of any 
such connections’ (Lattimore 1969: 119). Though Russia had supported Tokhtogo prior to the 
end of Qing dynasty and the declaration of independence in Urga and Hailar, he was now no 
longer needed to support the Russian position in Hulunbeir. For the time being, China’s 
position was too weak to pose a threat to Russia’s security and influence in the region. 
 
Since St Petersburg obviously did not support the idea of a Pan-Mongolian empire, it treated 
Hulunbeir’s indigenous leaders lukewarmly and advised them to compromise with the 
Chinese authorities. These negotiations came to nothing, however, since Urga warmly 
received the pledge of the Hulunbeir leaders to be made a protectorate of the independent 
region of Khalkha. In May 1912, Shengfu (勝福), a member of the Dagur gentry who had 
been a leading figure in the Hulunbeir rebellion, was installed at Hailar as the Urga 
Khutukhtu’s viceroy and imperial resident (amban)22 (Woodhead 1914: 622). Shengfu’s 
appointment followed a long tradition by which Dagurs generally were more educated than 
members of other banners, and thus tended to dominate the tribal affairs in Hulunbeir by 
monopolising official appointments (Lattimore 1969: 167–8). 
 
By acknowledging China’s command over Outer Mongolia while negotiating with the 
Mongols, Russia played a double game. In Hulunbeir this strategy raised delicate questions. 
On the one hand, St Petersburg recognised that Hulunbeir joined the autonomous Khalkha; on 
the other, the Chinese customs house remained open in Manzhouli (Mongoliia 1913: 15). 
 
In China, the retention of Mongolia and other frontiers as dependencies was disputed during 
the early years of the Republic.23 At no point was Hulunbeir’s independence stable and 
secure. By May 1912, the Heilongjiang provincial assembly (省議會) was discussing two 
burning questions: namely, how to prevent foreign interference in Hulunbeir and how to 
convince the indigenous tribes of the district to submit to rule by the Republic of China. That 
same month, the Heilongjiang provincial government circulated leaflets in Hulunbeir aiming 
to win the hearts of the Mongols. The handbill, printed in Mongolian, promised equality 
among all ethnic groups in the Republic of China, as well as respect for their rights to 
autonomy. It warned the people not to await support from Russia, as this would mean a 
violation of international law and was therefore unlikely to happen. In the next paragraph, 
however, the friendly tone turned frosty:  
 
You cannot rely on your armed forces, for its strength does not exceed 1,000 
men and thus is not able to resist the [Heilongjiang] government forces. Your 
soldiers are untrained and only a small minority of them is more or less able to 
handle guns. Such a quantity and quality of your soldiers is not enough to mess 
with Qiqihar military forces, of which three percent would be enough to 
definitely defeat you. 
 
The leaflet concluded with a call for a peaceful resolution to the various gambits for 
independence, and the promise that the handover in January 1912 would have no 
repercussions (RGIA, Shtab 15.5.1912: quotation on 111). 
 
Nevertheless, a punitive expedition carried out by a Chinese regiment against Tokhtogo’s 
native Jirim league in the autumn of 1912 roused concerns among the Mongols in Hulunbeir. 
Local Mongol officials in Hailar feared that the expedition augured an attempt by Chinese 
troops to cross the Xingan mountains and retake Hulunbeir. However, Song Xiaolian, the new 
Governor of Heilongjiang province – the former Chinese administrator of Hulunbeir and as 
such an extreme advocate of sinicization – decided against the military option, for the time 
being. Song seconded his delegates’ request to negotiate with Mongols in Hailar and to work 
towards reunification with China (‘Ugroza Barge’ / ‘Barga under threat’, Kharbinskii vestnik 
[Harbin Herald] 10.10.1912 (23.10.1912): 2). 
 
But a Russo-Chinese agreement signed on 5 November 1913 represented a defeat for the 
Chinese government. Russia recognised Chinese control over the entirety of Inner Mongolia, 
while China acknowledged the fait accompli of Outer Mongolian autonomy. Independent 
Mongolia was thus reduced to Outer Mongolia. Hulunbeir was not mentioned at all in the 
agreement (Paine 1996: 295–8; Woodhead 1914: 633–5). 
 
High politics between Beijing and St Petersburg on the matter of Mongolian independence 
proved to be a burden for the indigenous borderlanders, causing particular anxiety in Hailar. 
The disappointment following Russian rejection of support for Hulunbeir autonomy and the 
subsequent pact in November worried representatives of Hulunbeir’s indigenous elite and 
divided its people into two camps, along banner lines. The ‘Old Bargut’ (Solons, Chipchin 
and Dagurs) swallowed the Russo-Chinese agreement while the ‘New Bargut’ (Buriat) 
banners still agitated for unification with Outer Mongolia.24 Some even threatened to emigrate 
to Khalkha, on the chance that Hulunbeir would be incorporated back into China. In late 
February 1914, the imperial resident Shengfu had reached a preliminary agreement with 
diplomatic representatives from Heilongjiang province. First, the people of Hulunbeir were to 
become Chinese subjects again. Second, Hulunbeir was to be declared a special autonomous 
district outside the Chinese provincial administration, under the direct control of the Chinese 
central government. Third, military requirements were to be met with a local militia body, so 
that the region might be free of any Chinese troops (RGIA, Shtab 25.11.1913 and 22.3.1914). 
 
During a congress in spring 1914, the schism between the ‘Old Bargut’ banners on the one 
side and ‘New Bargut’ banners on the other broke wide open. Officials from all 17 banners 
gathered for 11 days in Hailar under the presidency of imperial resident Shengfu. The ‘New 
Bargut’ openly accused the Dagurs of accepting bribes and gifts from the Chinese. Dagurs 
(belonging to the ‘Old Bargut’), for their part, tried to delay the close of the conference. They 
still waited for the approval of the preliminary agreement by the Chinese central government 
in Beijing and the Heilongjiang provincial government in Qiqihar. At one point, a Dagur 
regimental commander raised his voice to address the assembly. He took a gloomy tone, 
speaking for many in expressing his deep frustration with Russian perfidy, and proposing 
instead a Chinese solution:  
 
When we struggled for autonomy with weapons in our hands, we were 
convinced to unite with independent Khalkha, and the Russian government 
pledged to fully support us. Now it has become evident that the Russian 
government has broken its promises, putting us in a difficult position. If we do 
not take our fate in our hands now, our enemies will wipe us out. […] 
Wouldn’t it be better to accept Chinese authority right away instead of resisting 
and shedding our blood in vain? 
 
With a military force of fewer than 3000 poorly trained and inadequately equipped soldiers, 
no one was really in the mood for fighting. Nonetheless the gathering ended without a 
satisfactory resolution (RGIA, Shtab 20.4.1914: quotation on 155-155 obl.; ‘Khailar’ / 
‘Hailar’, Zabaikal’skaia nov’, 19.4.1914 (2.5.1914): 3). 
 
 
THE CALL FOR INDEPENDENCE SLOWLY FADES: THE STATUS OF HULUNBEIR 
AFTER 1915 
 
Russia’s policy towards Mongolia following independence had been realistic and prudent, 
reflecting the different lights in which imperial officials saw Outer Mongolia and Hulunbeir. 
For Outer Mongolia, policymakers in St Petersburg sought to preserve some degree of 
administrative autonomy, to prevent Chinese military deployment and colonisation, and to 
obtain special economic interests and rights for Russia. The ultimate goal in the long run was 
to exclude Outer Mongolia from China’s sphere of interest, thereby creating a buffer state. 
 
According to this policy, Outer Mongolia was granted a quasi-independent status in which it 
remained under both Chinese control and Russian protection, a decision born of international 
pressures at a tripartite conference of Russia, China and Mongolia in Kiakhta on 7 June 
1915.25 To Russian observers, the politically immature princes at Urga were mere puppets in a 
‘Great Game’ between Japan, Russia and China. Russia’s main concern had been the creation 
of a buffer state to prevent China from building up military forces at the border. A unified 
Mongol empire was not needed for this purpose, and would, moreover, have provoked a 
conflict with Japan over interest spheres. ‘Mongolian nationalism’, Vestnik Azii [Herald of 
Asia] concluded, ‘had unfortunately clashed with stronger forces’ (Mongoliia 1915: 112). 
 
Indeed, when the ‘Hulunbeir question’ was settled several months later, Russian and Chinese 
negotiators paid little attention to the needs and requests of Hulunbeir’s indigenous 
representatives. The final arrangement dictated that the region’s independence from China 
would be weaker than Outer Mongolia’s quasi-autonomy. The agreement settling Hulunbeir, 
ratified by the Republic of China and the Russian empire on 6 November 1915 in Beijing, 
adopted nearly all of the original Russian proposals, the ones Sazonov had initially doubted 
the Chinese would accept. Hulunbeir was declared a special district, directly subject to the 
central government in Beijing. The pre-reform administrative structure was restored: the 
Mongol banner vice commander-in-chief of the Hulunbeir garrison (fudutong)26 would enjoy 
the rank of provincial governor and was to be appointed via presidential decree. Collective 
ownership of land was granted to bannermen. In times of peace military presence would be 
limited to a standing local militia, although in cases of insurgency the Chinese government 
would maintain the right to dispatch its own troops after giving notice to the Russian 
government. (But since Russia controlled the main passage to Hulunbeir – the Chinese 
Eastern Railroad – hidden military advance seemed unlikely.) All taxes and duties, except 
customs, would continue to flow into the coffers of the local government.  
 
With this agreement, Russia assumed the role of mediator between Hulunbeir and China in 
return for additional privileges, as the declaration salvaged Russian economic interests in 
Hulunbeir. It was a grave defeat for Chinese diplomacy. Between 1915 and 1920, the region 
remained de facto under the joint control of Russia and China (Lan 1996: 218–23; Tang 1959: 
87–90).27 The agreement also marked a serious setback for the indigenous struggle for self-
rule. Just as the Russian authorities had forgotten about Tokhtogo as soon as he had lost his 
possible strategic value for them, the voices of Hulunbeir’s indigenous inhabitants had been 
heard only insofar as they served imperial needs. 
 
Thus, it is hardly surprising that, despite the settlement exluding Hulunbeir from autonomous 
Outer Mongolia, the fight for independence from Chinese rule continued there after 1915. 
Probably the most prominent figure in that struggle was Babuzhaba.28 Born in 1875, he had 
been paramount in the revolt of the Kharachins, a sub-ethnic group in eastern Inner Mongolia. 
Babuzhaba’s freedom struggles gained more attention from contemporaries and historians 
than had those led by Tokhtogo, who had lived in Outer Mongolia since 1911, where he took 
to opium and, after his arrest by the Bolsheviks, died in 1922 (LOC, Lattimore (undated): 8). 
Certainly, Babuzhaba became the more prominent figure because he did not give peace to 
Hulunbeir or to its contiguous neighbours, Inner Mongolia and Khalkha, after the annulment 
of independence.29 In 1917, remnants of Babuzhaba’s troops surfaced again; but in this last 
campaign, his reputation would be reduced to that of an ordinary robber. In May 1917, after 
the Kharachin bandits had chased Shengfu and other loathed Dagurs out of their homesteads 
around Hailar, where they had largely stuck to two villages, they entered the native section of 
the city. There they looted all Chinese stores, the administrative offices and private properties 
of the Mongol fudutong and the premises of the Dagur oligarchy. Until soldiers from the 
Russian garrison checked the Kharachins in September 1917, the natives of Hulunbeir once 
again self-administered the region, this time under a regime of terror. In January of 1918, the 
Chinese President Yuan Shikai assured monetary compensation to its victims. After months 
of violence, the Dagurs returned to Hailar (Meshcherskii 1920: 7–12; ‘Khailar 12 maia’ / 
‘Hailar, May 12th’, Kharbinskii vestnik, 25.5.1917 (7.6.1917): 3; Cui 2000: 204–17). 
 
Not until the Russian Civil War did Russia’s imperial position weaken along the Chinese 
border. On 28 June 1920, when Russia no longer could guarantee indigenous self-rule, the 
1915 treaty spelling out terms of governance over Hulunbeir was revoked, and a Chinese 
presidential mandate finally rescinded the region’s autonomy for good. It again reverted to the 
supervisory control of the administration of Heilongjiang province. The provincial 
government of Heilongjiang acted wisely, authorising the yamen of the Mongol fudutong to 
continue administering the local affairs of the banner population in the Hulunbeir district. The 
Mongols thus retained a distinctive structure of local government (Kormazov 1928: 59–62; 
Baranov 1926: 23–6). 
 
During the 1920s, many people in Hulunbeir and other Mongol lands still belonging to 
Republican China retained aspirations for greater independence. The rallying cries emanating 
from that region were echoed by leaders in the newly created Mongolian People’s Republic. 
Though the Bolsheviks maintained the fiction that Outer Mongolia, after its foundation in 
1924, was an independent state, it in fact became the first communist satellite of the Soviet 
Union. Accordingly, Ulanbataar’s ultimate goal, soon abandoned, of regaining Inner 
Mongolia and Hulunbeir, and thereby uniting a pan-Mongolian state, must be interpreted 
within this new political framework.30 
 
In contrast to independence efforts during the late Qing years, when indigenous leaders 
sought aid from St Petersburg, the independence movement in Hulunbeir of the 1920s was 
thus strongly influenced by ideological ties to Moscow. The Hulunbeir Mongols planned their 
revolt fully expecting to receive Moscow’s secret assistance. Precisely because of its 
presumption of ideological contiguousness, the rebellion was doomed to fail when Moscow 
ultimately refused to support it (Atwood 2002: vol. 2, 844–853, 861–887). It would be the last 
flickering of an indigenous resistance in the Hulunbeir borderlands to gain even a modicum of 
support from the Soviet Union, to be understood by the latter as a blow against Chinese rule. 
In the assessment of Owen Lattimore, in his time a leading scholar of Inner Asia, by the late 
1920s the ‘more or less unreal and romantic nationalism’ of Inner Mongolia was in decline: 
 
The question is no longer one of degrees of autonomy or nominal 
independence within rival Russian, Japanese and Chinese spheres of influence. 
On the economic side there is only the question of the presence or absence of 
colonial exploitation; on the political side, the degree of social revolution or 
counterrevolution. (Lattimore 1936: 405) 
 
Developments in Inner and Outer Mongolia over the ensuing decades support Lattimore’s 
view. Following the Japanese occupation of the eastern and central parts of Inner Mongolia in 
the early and mid 1930s, the majority of the Mongol population fell under Japanese rule. That 
moment saw a movement for independence and unification blossom again for a few years, as 
the Japanese reckoned that Mongol nationalism could act as a counterweight to any possible 
Han-Chinese domination. Japan also created a Mongol Xingan province within its satellite 
state of Manchukuo, which would become an enclave granted considerable autonomy. Self-
rule came at the cost, however, of the absorption of Mongol ambitions into the objectives of 





During the early twentieth century, the Chinese frontier areas suffered from a complex 
political amalgam of Chinese claims, Russian and Soviet ambitions and the hopes of 
indigenous leaders. The Manchu court had opted to implement ‘New Policies’ in the imperial 
periphery for the sake of national defence, in other words adopting new mechanisms of direct 
control and the encouragement of Han-Chinese colonisation. The Mongolian bannerlands, the 
last frontier area still under the old system, and an intermediate zone between the Chinese and 
the Russian empires for centuries, were in effect gradually transformed into units similar to 
typical Chinese provinces.  
 
Indigenous borderlanders responded with a movement towards independence. Motivations for 
secession were multilayered, ranging from socio-economic relief to political liberation, and 
from personal interests to the restoration of historical glory. Biographies of ‘detached people’ 
like Tokhtogo reflect many elements of this concatenation. Though the movement was not a 
result of Russian instigation, the tsarist empire, in contrast to the Chinese, perceived the local 
populace in the border areas as potential allies in its attempt to expand its informal spheres of 
interest beyond the state border. Hoping to use Tokhtogo as a puppet who would extend the 
influence beyond its borders, the tsarist regime granted him asylum in Transbaikalia. After the 
Qing empire had collapsed, however, China was weakened and would no longer pose a threat 
to Russia’s position in the imperial borderlands. By supporting and instructing the local 
insurgents in Hulunbeir, Russia had succeeded in strengthening its position at the border and 
along the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Russia did not need indigenous leaders like Tokhtogo any 
longer and the government in St Petersburg was not willing to support the idea of an 
independent Mongolian state that would include Hulunbeir. Thus ultimately, the pan-
Mongolian project to unite all tribes within a Greater Mongolian State – which the American 
Mongolist Robert A. Rupen once interpreted as the most powerful indigenous idea in Inner 
Asia in the twentieth century (Rupen 1956: 388–92) – was not strong enough to compete with 
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Bargut’, since they arrived in Hulunbeir only after 1735. 	
25 According to the eleventh article of the treaty, Hulunbeir remained outside the scope of 
autonomous Outer Mongolia. On the outcomes of this conference, see Lan (1996: 209–18); 
Nakami (1999: 75–6); Paine (1996: 298–305). 	
26 See note 14 for explanation.	
27 The entire agreement is published in Hulunbei’er gaiyao (1930: 59–63).	
28 Also referred to as Babuujab. 	
29 On the resistance of Babuzhaba in the years 1902 to 1917, see Lan (1996: 239–49) and Cui 
(2000: 205–13).	
30 The status of Outer Mongolia was not yet fixed. With the Russian Revolution and the 
turmoil of Civil War, Bogd Khan lost the backing of St Petersburg. Outer Mongolia was then 
occupied by Chinese troops in 1919. What followed was a period of disorder and confusion, 
fuelled by the echoes of the civil war in Russia. On 25 November 1924, the Mongolian 
People’s Republic was founded. It became the first communist country outside the Soviet 
Union (Elleman 1993: 539–63; Paine 1996: 314–42). 	
31 The most detailed account of the history of the revolutionary movement in Inner Mongolia 
during the 1920s, drawing on Mongolian archives but largely understating the international 
framework of China, the Soviet Union and Japan, is the two-volume work by Atwood (2002). 
For the independence movement in Inner Mongolia during the late 1920s to mid 1930s and its 
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